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NOTES
THE DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD
INITIATIVE AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of eminent domain for urban redevelopment is not a new
phenomenon.' Although governments originally exercised eminent
domain for projects that would be of actual use to the public, this
power has evolved into one that governments use or delegate to private
entities for projects that merely benefit the public in some manner. 2
Under this broad formulation of public benefit, governments and
private corporations use the power of eminent domain to attack the
problem of urban decay.'
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative ("Initiative") is the
first grass-roots community organization in the country to gain emi-
nent domain authority over parcels of private land. 4 Its use of eminent
domain would likely satisfy the broad public use requirement.' Never-
theless, the exercise of eminent domain by a private corporation raises
issues regarding who may exercise this traditionally government-based
power.
This Note provides an overview of traditional and modern uses of
the power of eminent domain and argues that its use by the Dudley
Street Neighborhood Initiative is proper. Section II examines the de-
velopment of eminent domain doctrine generally.° Section III describes
I The Massachusetts and Missouri Urban Redevelopment Corporations statutes were origi-
nally enacted in the 1940s. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 1 (1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.010
(1991).
2 See Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599, 606 (1948).
3 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, A Neighborhood Starts to Recover from Decline, CinusTiAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 21, 1994, at 10.
5 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
6 See infra notes 10-40 and accompanying text.
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the use of eminent domain in urban redevelopment, discussing Su-
preme Court cases, issues of delegation, and two state statutes author-
izing urban redevelopment corporations to use eminent domain! Section
IV provides an overview of the history and purpose of the Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative! Section V analyzes the constitutionality of the
Initiative's exercise of the power of eminent domain in light of concerns
regarding public benefit and delegation:" This Note concludes that a
court examining the Initiative's use of eminent domain would
likely find it constitutional, although the court might be uneasy with
setting a precedent for the widespread use of this power by private
entities.
II. EMINENT DOMAIN IN GENERAL
The roots of modern eminent domain power can be traced back
at least to the early Roman Empire."' Although there is little direct
evidence of its use, scholars have pointed to the construction of the
Roman roads, extending in a straight line from one end of the Empire
to the other, as an indication of the power of the state to take private
property." Likewise, early English law contains indirect evidence of
practices that resemble eminent domain takings.' 2
In the United States, colonial governments utilized eminent do-
main powers to a limited extent.'` For example, a 1639 Massachusetts
statute authorized county courts to appoint local citizens to lay out a
highway upon a complaint stating that one was needed." The statute
prohibited destroying houses, gardens or orchards, but allowed com-
pensation for damage to other "improved ground."'`' In addition to this
common exercise of eminent domain for public road building, most
colonies also used eminent domain to take land for private rights-of-
way."' In general, however, colonial governments did not need to ex-
7 See infra notes 41-175 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 176-215 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 216-58 and accompanying text.
I° See Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent' Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL.
L. 1,7 (1980).
11 Id. at 7; William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WAsti. L. Rim 553,
553-54 (1972).
12 See Meidinger, supra note 10, at 8-9. Meidinger notes that well into the eighteenth century,
the English law of takings consisted of a variety of loosely related arrangements, generally
reflecting the relative powers of the King, the Parliament and the land owners when the arrange-
ments were made. Id. at 9.
13 See id. at 13.
14 Id.
18 Id.
16 Id. at 14.
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ercise eminent domain because there were vast tracts of government-
controlled land available in the public domain and governmental
activities were relatively limited.' 7
The requirement of just compensation imposed a significant limi-
tation on the exercise of eminent domain during the colonial period.' 8
Although the federal and many state constitutions explicitly included
this requirement, it was accepted widely as a principle of natural law.
Consequently, a number of early state constitutions omitted the re-
quirement.' 9
The public use requirement also developed as a principle of natu-
ral law. 2° Natural law justified eminent domain as being for the public
good, the public necessity or the public utility. 21 As courts turned away
from natural law in favor of constitutional interpretation in other
fields, they looked to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution when deciding eminent domain cases. 22
In general, courts have taken either a broad or narrow view of the
public use requirement." In an 1832 case, a New jersey court, applying
the broad view of the public use requirement, upheld legislation allow-
ing a private corporation to take land for seventy mill sites along the
Delaware River. 24
 The court rejected the argument that the legislation
took private property for private use, intimating that the statute should
be upheld because the community generally benefitted from it. 2'
In reaction to this broad view that a taking met the public use test
if it contributed to the overall benefit of the community, a number of
courts developed the view that public use meant literally "use by the
public."26
 These courts found insufficient the justification that a use
made an indirect contribution to the prosperity of the entire commu-
nity by allowing a few individuals to profit. 27
 Instead, the public had to
17
 The Public Use Limitation of Eminent Domain, supra note 2, at 600.
to ld.
19 Id.
26 Id. at 601.
21 Id.
22
 See The Public Use Limitation of Eminent Domain, supra note 2, at 602-03. The Fifth
Amendment states, "nor shall private property be taken for public nse, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CoNsT. arnend. V.
29 See Meidinger, supra note 10, at 24; Amy E. Kellogg, Case Comment, Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff: The Continued Validity of the Public Use Doctrine, 47 Outo STATE 1,1. 521,
523 (1986).
"Meidinger, supra note 10, at 23-24 (citing Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., I N.J.
Eq. 694 (1832)).
25 Meidinger, supra note 10, at 24.
26 See Lawrence Berger, The. Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203,
208 (1978); Meidinger, supra note 10, at 24.
27
 The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, supra note 2, at 603.
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possess a right to use the facility or service for which the property was
desired before a court would deem the use public. 28
Despite the seeming clarity that this articulation of the public use
requirement provided, courts had difficulty applying it." On the one
hand, a court would have to decide what proportion of the public must
have a right of use for a purpose to justify the exercise of eminent
domain." On the other hand, this narrow test might permit a taking
for the construction of theaters and hotels, which the public would use
but had never before been thought to justify eminent domain. 3 ' Courts
also had difficulty with the narrow test because they had been sanc-
tioning the use of eminent domain to further certain private activities,
such as railroad construction, for too long to declare such uses inap-
propriate." To escape these difficulties, courts used evasive and awkward
rationales, or created exceptions to the narrow test." By the beginning
of the twentieth century, the exceptions became so wide and so nu-
merous that courts rarely invoked the narrow "use by the public" test."
Although courts now read the public use requirement broadly,
they will impose limits on takings that they regard as "going too far.""
Lawrence Berger, in his article, The Public Use Requirement of Eminent
Domain, posits that courts now look at two issues besides public use
when determining the propriety of a nongovernmental taking: (1)
Does the condemner's need for the taking outweigh the harm to the
condemnee? and (2) Is it necessary that eminent domain be used to
carry out the project, or could a purchase in the open market practi-
cably be made?" Courts have used the first test when permitting one
private individual to condemn a right of way over a neighbor's land."
In this situation, the condemnor's need for access to the property
greatly outweighs the slight harm to the condemnee." Berger finds
support for the existence of the second test in the tendency of courts
to limit nongovernmental takings to those instances where purchase is
not feasible." Purchase is not feasible where one party holds land for
28 Id.
29 See id.
" Id.
sl Id. at 604; see Berger, supra note 26, at 208.
32 See The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, supra note 2, at 604.
"See id.
" Id. at 606.
35 Berger, supra note 26, at 223.
" Id. at 223-24.
37 Id. at 224.
35 Id. at 223-24.
39 See id. at 224-25.
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speculation and does not want to sell at or even above the fair market
value."
III. EMINENT DOMAIN AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
A. Supreme Court Decisions
The United States Supreme Court, in 1954, in Berman v. Parker,
adopted the broad view of the public use requirement, upholding the
constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of
1945 (the "Act").41 Section 2 of the Act contained a congressional
determination that blighted housing conditions in the District of Co-
lumbia threatened public health and safety. 42 Acquisition of property
was one of the means Section 2 declared necessary to eliminate these
housing conditions."
The first project that the Planning Commission pursued under
the Act was in Southwest Washington, D.C. 44 The plan for this neigh-
borhood specified the boundaries and allocated the land for various
purposes, making detailed provisions for types of dwelling units and
setting maximum rental fees for certain units." Section 4 of the Act
granted the District of Columbia Land Agency (the "Agency") powers
to acquire and assemble property by eminent domain and charged it
with implementing the plan."
The owners of the targeted property on which a department store
was located brought suit to enjoin the appropriation of their property.47
They argued that because their property was not slum housing, the
government was not justified in condemning it as part of a project to
eradicate slum housing." The government could not take their prop-
erty, the owners argued, merely to develop a better balanced, more
attractive community." The owners also objected to the fact that the
property ultimately would be redeveloped for private, not public, use."
40 Berger, supra note 26, at 225.
41 348 U.S. 20, 33 (1954).
42 Id. at 28.
." Id.
Id. at 30.
45 Id. al 30-31.
46 Berman, 348 U,S. at 29.
41 1d. at 31.
48 Id.
411 Id.
50 Id.
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The Supreme Court viewed eminent domain as a vehicle used by
states to exercise their traditional police powers. 5 ' The Court construed
as extremely narrow the role of the judiciary in determining whether
eminent domain is being exercised for a public purpose. 52 It reasoned
that the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public
needs to be served by social legislation." The Court stated that once
Congress and its agencies have made determinations that take into
account a wide variety of values, it is not the Court's role to reappraise
them.54 The authors of the redevelopment plan concluded that in
order to be healthy and not revert to a slum area, the neighborhood
must be planned as a whole. 55 The Court thus reasoned that it could
not permit a single landowner to resist the redevelopment plan on the
ground that his or her particular property was not being used for the
public interest.56 The Court determined that the redevelopment plan
served the public purpose and, therefore, the Court would leave to
legislative discretion the amount and character of land to be used for
the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the inte-
grated plan. 57
The Supreme Court revisited the public use issue in the 1984 case
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff and held that the Land Reform
Act of 1967 does not violate the public use requirement." In Hawaii
Housing Authority, landowners challenged the Land Reform Act of
1967, which created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts
and transferring ownership of the condemned fees simple to existing
lessees. 59 Hawaii needed such a drastic measure to redress its unique
problem of extremely concentrated land ownership. 6°
This concentration grew out of the feudal land tenure system in
which one island high chief controlled all land and assigned it for
development to certain subchiefs. 6 ' Although Hawaiian leaders and
American settlers, beginning in the early 1800s, attempted to divide
the lands of the kingdom, these efforts proved largely unsuccessful,
and the land remained in the hands of a few.62 After conducting
51 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
52 1(1.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 33.
55 Id. at 34.
56 Berman, 348 U.S. at 35.
57 Id. at 35-36.
58 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
" Id. at 233-34.
1 i9 Id. at '233.
61 Id. al 232.
62 Id.
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extensive hearings in the mid-1960s, the Hawaii legislature concluded
that concentrated land ownership skewed the state's residential fee
simple market, inflating land prices and injuring the public tranquility
and welfare."
The legislature considered requiring large landowners to sell lands
that they were leasing to homeowners, but the landowners strongly
resisted this scheme, pointing out the significant federal tax liabilities
they would incur." In response, the legislature enacted the Land Re-
form Act of 1967 (the "Act"). 65
 By condemning the land in question,
the Hawaii legislature intended to make the land sales involuntary,
thereby making the federal tax consequences less severe while still
facilitating the redistribution of fees
Under the Act, the Hawaii Housing Authority (the "Authority")
can institute a condemnation proceeding when a certain percentage
of the residential lease lots within a development tract have applied to
the Authority for condemnation.° The Authority followed this proce-
dure to condemn some land belonging to the plaintiffs in the instant
case.G8 When the Authority directed the plaintiffs to negotiate with
their lessees concerning the sale of designated properties, they refused
and instead filed suit in United States district court.' 9 The district court
held that the Act's goals were within the state's police powers and that
the means the legislature had chosen were not arbitrary, capricious or
selected in bad faith." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court and held that the transfers of property
authorized under the Act did not meet the public use requirement of
the Fifth Amendment. 7 '
The Supreme Court in Hawaii Housing Authority followed its de-
cision in Berman v. Parker and stated that the public use requirement
is coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers. 72
 The only
role left to the courts is to review a legislature's judgment of what
constitutes a proper exercise of its police power, and as the Berman
court made clear, this is an extremely narrow role." The Court stated
" Hawaii Thus. Auth., 467 U.S. at 233.
Id.
to Id,
e.6
67 Kellogg, supra note 23, at 528.
w See Hawaii Hems. Auth., 467 U.S. at. 234.
69
 Id. at 234-35.
79 M. at 235.
71 Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Berman required that the government possess and use
the property at some point during a taking. Id. at 243.
72 Hawaii Ihms, Auth., 467 U.S. at 240.
73 Id.
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that it will overrule a legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public
use only if the use is palpably without reasonable foundation.74
The Court concluded that the Hawaii legislature had a reasonable
foundation for determining that the high concentration of land own-
ership produced social and economic evi1. 76
 Thus, the legislature could
exercise its police powers, including eminent domain, to alleviate it."
The Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit read cases such
as Berman too narrowly. 78 The Court indicated that the Ninth Circuit
misinterpreted Berman as requiring that the government possess and
use the property at some point during a taking. 79 To clarify its position,
the Court stated that the mere fact that property is taken outright by
eminent domain and transferred immediately to private beneficiaries
does not mean that taking has only a private purpose. 8° The Court
further stated that it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechan-
ics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause of the Fifth
Amendmen t. 8 '
In 1992, in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine
Corp., the Supreme Court followed its decision in Hawaii Housing
Authority, upholding a statute allowing condemnation of an interest in
a railroad track." The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (the "Act")
created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), a
quasi-public corporation. 83
 The Act allowed Amtrak to ask the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (the "ICC") to condemn railroad prop-
erty required for inter-city rail passenger service if Amtrak and the
railroad could not agree upon sale terms. 84 Amtrak had a trackage
rights agreement with the Boston and Maine Corporation ("B & M")
to operate its trains between Washington, D.C., and Montreal. 85 Amtrak
claimed that B & M's neglect of track maintenance forced Amtrak to
discontinue its service to Montreal." Amtrak then requested the ICC
to compel conveyance of the tracks to Amtrak, which would reconvey
74 1d. at 241.
75 Id,
76 See id. at 242.
77
 Hawaii Haus. Auth., 467 U.S. at 242.
78 Id. at 243.
79 Id.
8° Id. at 243-44.
81
 Id. at 244.
82 503 U.S. 407, 419 (1992).
" Id. at 410.
" Id. at 411.
85 Id.
88 Id. at 412.
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them to another corporation that agreed to provide funds to upgrade
the track, to maintain the track for twenty years in a suitable condition,
to grant Amtrak trackage rights for twenty years, and to grant B & M
trackage rights to serve its existing customers."
B & M argued, inter alia, that this condemnation followed by
reconveyance violated the public use requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment."" The Supreme Court rejected this argument, citing its decisions
in Hawaii Housing Authority and Berman."` The Court noted that, in
both earlier cases and the present case, condemnation resulted in the
transfer of ownership from one private party to another." The Court
reiterated its holdings in Hawaii Housing Authority and Berman, stating
that this exercise of the eminent domain power was constitutional as
long as the condemning authorities were rational in their positions
that some public purpose was served. 9 ' It found no reason to doubt
that the ICC was rational in determining that the condemnation in the
instant case would serve a public purpose. 92
 Thus, the Court held that
the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment was met by the
condemnation of these tracks, despite the subsequent reconveyance to
a private party.95
B. Delegation Doctrine and Eminent Domain
The above Supreme Court cases involve governmental agencies
exercising the power of eminent domain." The focus of these decisions
is on the use to which the condemned land will be put, rather than on
who is doing the condemning. 95
 In the area of urban redevelopment,
statutes in several states authorize private redevelopment corporations
to exercise the power of eminent domain.•"' This raises delegation
87
 National R.R. Passenger Carp., 503 U.S. at 412. The Court specifically rejected the plaintiff's
argument that this exercise of eminent domain by the ICC on behalf of Amtrak represented an
improper delegation of eminent domain power to a private entity. Id, at 419. The Court noted
that. the statute gives the power to the ICC, a government agency, which must assess the impact
of any condemnation and make a determination as to just compensation. Id.
88
 M. at 422.
"9 Id.
m Id.
8 Id.
92
 National R.R. Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 422.
95 Id,
91 See id. at 419; Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984); Berman v,
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
• 5 See National R.R. Passenger Carp., 503 U.S. at 421 -22.
96 See, e.g., 315 ILCS 20/1 to-44 (1993); Mass. GEN. L. ch. 121A, §§ 1-19 (1988); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 353.010-.180 (1991).
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issues similar to when an administrative agency exercises legislative
power. "7 Although the law is well settled in allowing the transfer of land
to private parties following the exercise of eminent domain by a gov-
ernment body,''" the issue of whether a wholly private corporation may
itself exercise this power without violating "nondelegation doctrine" is
less clear.""
Nondelegation doctrine on the federal level refers to a principle
restricting Congress in its delegation of its legislative powers to oth-
ers. 1 °t" The United States Constitution clearly embodies a system of
separation of powers, vesting legislative, executive and judicial powers
in separate institutions. 10 ' The document, however, is unclear about
how rigidly these powers must be separated and, consequently, it is
vague concerning the application of separation of powers doctrine to
the delegation of powers.'°2
Given the ambiguity in the Constitution itself, nondelegation doc-
trine has been largely a Supreme Court creation.'" In examining a
particular delegation of legislative power, the Court looks at the scope
of the power and discretion involved. 1 °4 The Court articulated the
standard that delegations of legislative power would be sustained when-
ever Congress dictated an "intelligible principle" to which an agency
must conform.' 05 Using this standard, the Court, prior to the New Deal,
upheld sweeping regulatory delegations of broad legislative powers.'"
With the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933,
which gave the President almost total control of the economy, the
Court backed away from its permissive stance toward delegation. 1 °7
Three New Deal-era cases, however, in which the Court invalidated
delegations of legislative power for want of sufficient standards, were
the last instances in which the Court applied nondelegation doctrine
to overturn federal legislation.'"
112 See. David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 INn. L.J. 647, 658-59
(1986).
9" See Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
99 See vi.
100 Mary H. Strobel, Note, Delegation and Individual Rights, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1321, 1322
(1983).
ml Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1982).
102 See id.
145 See id. at 7.
1 " See id. at 8.
195 See id.; Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE L.J. 657, 662.
106
 See Allinson et al., supra note 101, at 8.
07
 See id.
1 "8 See id, at 10.
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The same justifications for broad delegations of powers by Con-
gress can be made for delegations by state and local governments.'° 9
These include pluralism and interest representation as well as flexibil-
ity, expertise and cost effectiveness of private agencies."'" Although
private exercise of federally delegated power is no longer an issue,'"
state courts have been increasingly likely to find violations of the
nondelegation doctrine." 2
Despite their willingness to find such violations, state courts have
not constructed a consistent body of case law." 3
 David M. Lawrence
suggests that this is due to the lack of any clear constitutional source
for rules against delegations. 14
 Although state courts cite the clause in
their respective constitutions vesting legislative power in the state leg-
islature, Lawrence stresses that this is an inadequate source for the
nondelegation doctrine. " 6
 Instead, he suggests utilizing due process
analysis to review delegations of legislative power to private actors. "s
Due process requires that decisionmakers must not be personally
biased, that they must make their decisions according to established
standards or a disinterested view of the public interest." 7
 Without this
requirement, some person or group will be worse off because the
officials who made the decisions allowed personal concerns to dictate
their actions. 1 l 8
 If the official is publicly elected, the political process
will serve as a check on this type of self-interested action."' If it is a
private party exercising delegated powers, however, the public may
have no similar recourse. 126
 In the latter instance, Lawrence would have
a court apply due process analysis to ensure that private actors are held
publicly accountable to the same degree as public officials. 12 '
1" See Lawrence, supra note 97, at 651-59.
11° See id. at 651-57; Strobel, supra note 100, at 1328-29.
11 ' Lawrence, supra note 97, at 649.
" 2 Id. at 650.
113 See id. at 651.
114 /d. at 650.
115 /d. at 651.
116 See Lawrence, supra note 97, at 658-59.
117 /d. at 661.
11 m/d.
119 Id. at 660.
12° Id. Similar objections are raised when the government takes land and then transfers it to
a private party. See Thomas Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities try the Power of Eminent
Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 355,369 (1988), These objections include: that private-transferee
takings are more likely to result from an improper motivation; that private-transferee takings do
not provide the continuing public accountability that exists following an ordinary taking; that
the societal perception of private-transferee takings as unfair may dissuade people from investing
in property; and that this type of taking creates an undesirable precedent against the application
of the public use doctrine. See id, at 369-70.
121 Lawrence, supra note 97, at 661.
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This approach would engage the court in a two-part analysis. 122
First, the court would analyze to what degree the delegation creates a
risk of conflict between public and private interests. 123 Second, the
court would determine, given the particular degree of public-private
conflict, whether safeguards must accompany the delegation, and, if
so, what type of safeguards. 124
The most common safeguards for a delegation of governmental
power would be a lack of any private interest in the party to whom the
power was delegated, a parallel interest between the delegate and the
public, and for the delegate to include all those affected by the deci-
sion."' Other safeguards include state agency review, liability in dam-
ages to those harmed by a misuse of the delegated power and the
requirement that the delegate be specially qualified to act pursuant to
basically fair procedures. 126
Lawrence points out two limitations on the use of due process to
protect against abuses of private delegations. 127 First, state and federal
due process clauses only protect against arbitrary government or pri-
vate delegate action that infringes on a person's life, liberty or prop-
erty. 128 Second, some delegations might not be reviewed because no
appropriate challenger exists."' Lawrence dismisses these potential
limitations by stating that most delegations clearly affect property in-
terests or liberty, and therefore appropriate challengers will always be
available.'"
Courts in only two states have examined the constitutionality of
delegating the eminent domain power to private corporations in the
redevelopment context.isi The Illinois Supreme Court, in 1945, in
Zurn v. City of Chicago, upheld the constitutionality of the Neighbor-
hood Redevelopment Corporations Law against a challenge that the
exercise of eminent domain power by a private corporation did not
satisfy the public use requirement.' 32 In 1965, the Missouri Supreme
Court, in Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp., held that
1221d. at 685 .
123 Id.
124 1d.
1 " Id. at 695.
12° See Lawrence, supra note 97, at 695.
127 Id. at 676.
in Id.
mu Id.
13° Id.
131 See Zurn v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25 (III. 1945); Annbar Assocs. v. West Side Redev.
Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 648 (Mo. 1965).
132 59 N.E.2d at 25.
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a taking by a private body under the Urban Redevelopment Corpora-
tions Law satisfied the public use requirement)"
In Zurn, a citizen of Chicago sought to enjoin the city from using
public funds in carrying out the provisions of the Neighborhood Re-
development Corporations Law (the "Act").'" The citizen challenged
the constitutionality of the Act based on the provisions granting private
Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporations the power of eminent
domain.'" The controlling question was whether the use to be made
of the condemned property was public or private)" The court rea-
soned that because the legislature had found the rehabilitation and
rebuilding of slum areas to be a public use, the court would only review
whether the Act's delegation of eminent domain to private corpora-
tions achieved this public purpose.'"'
The court concluded that the taking of property by the private
corporation served the public purpose of eliminating slum conditions;
it rejected the plaintiff's contention that the taking did not satisfy the
public use requirement because the continued use of the property for
public purposes after redevelopment could not be assured)" The
court held that the achievement of the redevelopment of slum and
blighted areas, as defined in the Act, constitutes a public use, regardless
of the use that may be made of the property after the redevelopment
has been achieved)"
Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Annbar Associates, up-
held the constitutionality of the Missouri Urban Redevelopment Cor-
porations Law ("Chapter 353"). 140 West Side Redevelopment Corporation
was an urban redevelopment corporation organized under Chapter
353 for the purpose of redeveloping a blighted area of Kansas City by
building a Hilton Hotel complex and convention facility."' The plain-
tiffs were owners of hotels outside the blighted area but within such
proximity to the proposed hotel as to be competing with it for busi-
ness. 142 Both parties agreed that the area was "blighted" within the
meaning of Chapter 353. 14 " The plaintiffs argued, however, that the
133 397 S.W.2d at 648.
134 59 N.E.2d at 19.
135
 Id. at 22.
136 Id.
137 See id.
1 m Id. at 25.
139 Zurn, 59 N.E.2d at 25.
140 397 S.W.2d at 648.
141 Id. at 638.
142 id,
149 Id. at 641.
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taking was in fact a taking of private property by a private corporation
for private use without the consent of the owner, a violation of the
Missouri and United States Constitutions.'"
The court rejected the distinction between a taking of private
property by a public body and a taking by a private corporation."' The
court reasoned that if authority exists to empower a public body to
acquire private property by eminent domain and sell it to private
enterprise for redevelopment, then such authority exists to empower
a private corporation to acquire property by such means for a public
purpose. 146 The court stated that it would not second-guess the legisla-
ture's decision to vest certain bodies with eminent domain power."'
Quoting Berman, the court noted that "once the object is within the
authority of [the legislature], the means by which it will be attained is
also for [the legislature] to determine." 348
Thus, the only question for the court was whether the taking was
for a public purpose.' 49 The court held that a legislative finding of a
public purpose is conclusive evidence that the contemplated use of the
property is public, unless it appears that the legislative finding was
arbitrary or was induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith.'" With no
evidence of arbitrariness, fraud, collusion or bad faith before it, the
court deferred to the Missouri legislature's finding that eminent do-
main under Chapter 353 served a public purpose, and held the statute
constitutional. 15 '
Both the Illinois and the Missouri Supreme Courts examined the
delegation of eminent domain power to private corporations as part
of the public use issue.' "2 The courts reasoned that if the use satisfied
the requirements of the public use doctrine, then it did not matter
whether the body doing the condemning is public or private.' 53
C. The Massachusetts Urban Redevelopment Corporations Statute
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 121A, recognizes that the
existence of blighted open, decadent or substandard areas in cities
144 Id. at 643.
145 Annbar Assocs.., 397 S.W.2d at 647.
141i Id.
147 1d.
He id.
149 See id. at 696,
15° Annbar Assocs., 397 S.W.2d at 646.
151 hi at 648.
152 See Zurn, 59 N.E.2d at 25; Annbar Assocs., 397 S.W.2d at 645.
153 See turn, 59 N.E.2d at 25; Annbar Assocs., 397 S.W.2d at 645.
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threatens public safety, health and welfare and constitutes an economic
and social liability.' 54 It declares the development of property for the
purpose of eliminating these conditions a public use and purpose for
which the state may expend public money, and bodies may exercise
the power of eminent domain.' 55 It also states that the provisions of the
chapter will stimulate the investment of private capital in blighted areas
that in turn will assist in eliminating existing slums.'"
Under Chapter 121A, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (the
"BRA") may delegate the exercise of eminent domain by urban redevel-
opment corporations for certain projects.'''''' The statute defines these
projects as:
any undertaking consisting of the construction in a blighted
open, decadent or sub-standard area of decent, safe and sani-
tary residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, recrea-
tional or governmental buildings and such appurtenant or
incidental facilities as shall be in the public interest, and the
operation and maintenance of such buildings and facilities
after construction.'"
An urban redevelopment corporation consists of three or more
persons who form a corporation for the purpose of undertaking
and carrying out a project authorized and approved by the BRA.'"
Such a corporation may not undertake more than one project or
engage in any other type of activity.' Chapter 121A also allows a
charitable corporation to act as an urban redevelopment corpora-
tion.' 6 '
Under Chapter 121A, any corporation authorized to undertake or
acquire projects under the chapter may lease land, or acquire land by
gift, purchase or exchange, or with approval of the housing board, may
take land by eminent domain. 162 Individuals, joint ventures, partner-
ships, limited partnerships, trusts or charitable corporations, however,
are not allowed to take land by eminent domain. 163
154 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 2 (1988).
155 Id.
156 id.
157 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 3 (1988).
158 Id. § 1.
1591d. § 3.
16° Id.
161 Id.
162 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 11 (1988).
163 1d. § 18C.
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To obtain approval from the BRA for a project under this statute,
an urban redevelopment corporation must submit an application and
go before the planning board and city council jointly.' 64
 Following this
hearing, the planning board and city council determine whether blighted
open, decadent or sub-standard conditions exist within the proposed
project area, whether the project is in accord with all applicable ordi-
nances and by-laws, whether the project would at least be non-detri-
mental to the best interests of the public or the city, and whether the
proposed project will constitute a public use. 165 If so, the council and
board may approve of the plan and issue a certificate to the BRA; the
BRA then makes its own determination of whether conditions exist
that warrant carrying out the project. 166
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that urban
redevelopment corporations, although in a sense private corporations,
perform functions for the public benefit analogous to those performed
by various other types of corporations commonly called "public service
corporations."' 67 In a 1960 Opinion of the Justices, the court held con-
stitutional a revised version of Chapter 121A, which extended the
scope of the definitions of projects to include the erection of commer-
cial, industrial and other types of buildings. 168 The court addressed
questions posed by the Massachusetts legislature regarding the consti-
tutionality of several revisions and amendments to Chapter 121A.' 69
The legislature was specifically concerned with the status of commer-
cial urban redevelopment projects.'" The court concluded that there
is no constitutional requirement that a blight, if removed in the course
of urban redevelopment, must be replaced by residential buildings in
order to satisfy the public purpose requirement.m The court used the
example of the Prudential Center, a commercial and residential urban
redevelopment project, to illustrate the balancing test it would apply
to determine whether a project were primarily public or private.' 72 The
public advantages of the project included elimination of grave doubts
as to the future use of a vast area, largely vacant or occupied by a nearly
obsolete, unsightly railroad freight yard; covering over a railroad right
164 Id. § 6.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See Opinion of the justices, 135 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Mass. 1956).
168 168 N.E.2d 858, 868 (Mass. 1960). The earlier version of Chapter 12IA referred solely to
the erection of "dwellings." Id. at 862.
169 See id. at 865.
I" See id.
171 Id. at 868.
172 See id. at 869.
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of way; improvement to neighboring properties; encouragement of
prompt action unlikely to be undertaken by private enterprise in the
foreseeable future; stimulation of other building; and new facilities
available for public use. "3 The court considered on the private side of
the equation the loss of tax revenue, the use and possible gain accruing
to private interests from a completed project, and other factors show-
ing a private character. 174 The court concluded that the public advan-
tages in this situation would outweigh the accompanying advantages
to private interests. 175
IV. THE DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE
Although located less than two miles from downtown Boston, the
Dudley Street neighborhood seems like another world. 176 Once a thriv-
ing neighborhood with many family-owned businesses and a vital com-
munity spirit, Dudley Street gradually turned into a wasteland as disin-
vestment, abandonment and arson took their toll.' 77
 By 1981, one-third
of Dudley's land was vacant, and it became a dumping ground for trash
from around the city and state. 17"
Through the process of "redlining," Greater Boston's banks re-
jected blacks throughout the city for mortgages more than three times
as often as they did whites with similar incomes."" In the Dudley
neighborhood, banks denied qualified minority residents the mort-
gages, insurance, home-improvement and home-equity loans that aid
successful homeownership."" In a similar manner, banks also denied
local businesses the loans and insurance they needed for start-up,
expansion and protection of their enterprises.'"' Redlining contributed
I" Opinion of the Justices, 168 N,E.2d at 869.
1741d.
175 See id.
' 76
 See Usha Lee McFarling, Turning Back a Toxic Tide on Dudley Street, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
13, 1994, at 1.
177 See Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
178 See id.; see also Scott Allen, Environmental Lawyers Unite to Help Low-Income Communities,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1994, at 36.
179 Michael Zuckoff& Peter G. Gosselin, Fed Finds a Racial Gulf in Mortgages, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 22, 1991, at 1.
189
 PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND Rise OF AN URBAN
NEIGHBORHOOD 24 (1994); see Peter S. Canellos, A Problem. that Won't Go Away: Activists Plan
New Initiatives, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 1991, at 45. "Redlining" is the practice by which lenders
and insurers brand certain neighborhoods as areas where they will not lend or supply the
necessary insurance, or will do so only at exorbitant interest rates or premiums. MEDOFF & SKLAR,
supra, at 24.
161 MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 180, at 25.
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to neighborhood stagnation, with official poverty and unemployment
rates nearly twice the Boston average. 182
Although Dudley residents recognized the need for redevelopment
of their neighborhood, they were skeptical of any government-spon-
sored efforts to do so.'" They had witnessed the "urban renewal/urban
removal" phenomenon in other Boston neighborhoods and feared a
similar outcome in their own. 184 To be successful, organizers of what is
now the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative had to recognize and
respond to this fear.'"
In 1984, La Alianza Hispana, a multiservice agency located on
Dudley Street, approached the Riley Foundation, a Massachusetts chari-
table trust known for innovation and risk-taking, for a grant to renovate
its facilities. 18" By coincidence, the Riley Foundation was looking ac-
tively at that time for a new project initiative to support) 87 The Riley
Foundation had made many grants in Boston's poorest neighborhoods,
but its trustees felt it could make more of a difference by providing
long-term support to one organization, freeing that organization from
major financial concerns and allowing it to concentrate on programs
rather than fund raising.'" After several months of research, the Riley
Foundation decided to focus its efforts on the Dudley Street neighbor-
hood.'"
Initially, the Riley Foundation worked through existing organizations
in the Dudley Neighborhood, forming the Dudley Advisory Group)"
This group voted unanimously to establish an organization, to set up
a committee to define its structure and to define the organization's
182 See id. at 3. The official poverty rate for the Dudley neighborhood is greater than one out
of three residents. Id.
183 See id. at 17 .
l" Id. Redevelopment efforts in the West End and South End of Boston provide the most
notorious examples of urban renewal accompanied by displacement of urban residents. See id.
at 17-22. The working-class West End neighborhood was demolished to make room, in part, fur
luxury housing overlooking the Charles River. Id. Before urban renewal, the South End was one
of Boston's only multiracial, multiethnic neighborhoods and also its densest and poorest. Id.
Through urban renewal, the decaying tree-shaded brownstones were converted into “yuppy"
condominiums, out of reach of most former South End residents. Id.
I" See id. at 19.
I " MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 180, at 39.
147 Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
IHH MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 180, at 43; see Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
I " See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 180, at 43-44; Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
I " MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 180, at 46. As of January 1985, the Dudley Advisory Group
participants included, among others, representatives of La Alianza Hispana; Boston Urban Gar-
deners; Cape Verdean Community House; Casa Esperanza; Community Training and Assistance
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geographic area." On February 23, 1985, about 200 people attended
the first community meeting of the newly created Dudley Street Neigh-
borhood Initiative ("DSNI") . 192 Dudley residents reacted negatively to
the structure of DSNI's governing board, in which only a minority of
seats (four out of twenty-three) were specifically designated for resi-
dents.' 93 Consequently, DSNI organizers held another community meet-
ing to create a new governance structure that would give the commu-
nity ultimate control.'"
From its inception, DSNI pursued short-term projects with imme-
diate results to sustain the community spirit necessary for successful
long-range development.'`J5 DSNI leaders realized community willpower
would be essential to developing the political power necessary to get
the city involved in DSNI's plans.'°° DSNI's first organizing campaign
focused on cleaning up the neighborhood. 197 The success of this cam-
paign in bringing the community together caught the attention of
Boston Mayor Ray Flynn, who offered the city's support in this effort.'"
In developing a long-term plan for the neighborhood, DSNI fo-
cused on the notion of an "urban village." 199 The village would have a
town common with a park, retail shops and community center, as well
as housing that would be both affordable and high quality. 2"° In addi-
tion to neighborhood control, the concept of "critical mass" was a key
element of the plan. 20 ' "Critical mass" refers to the process of aggregat-
ing sufficient square footage of new or rehabilitated space to affect the
existing market or create a market of its own. 202
Center; Roxbury Multi-Service Center; St. Patrick's Church; and Uphams Corner Health Center.
Id. at 46 n.10.
191 Id. at 46.
192 /d. at 52.
193 Id. at 53; see Spaid, supra note 4, at 10,
194 MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 180, at 56. Instead of a 23-member governing board with
only four designated community slots, the new board would have 31 members, with a resident
majority. Id. at 57. The neighborhood's four major cultures—Black, Cape Verdean, Latino and
White—would have equal minimum representation rather than representation based simply on
population ratios. Id.; see Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
195 MEDOFF & SKI-AR, supra note 180, at 67.
196 Id.
197 See Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
198 See MEDOFF &	 supra note 180, at 72.
199 See id. at 108.
20° Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. To meet critical mass, the plan recommended between 800 and 1000 units of new
construction and a rehabilitation program of over 1000 units. Id. It recommended a mix ranging
from one- and two-family homes and town houses to mid-rise apartment buildings. Id. The plan
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To gather the land necessary to achieve critical mass, DSNI needed
to consolidate ownership of the vacant land in the Triangle area at the
heart of the neighborhood.'" In 1988, of the thirty acres of vacant land
in the sixty-four-acre Triangle, fifteen were owned by the city of Boston
and fifteen were privately owned.'" Unfortunately, the fifteen acres of
city-owned land, which the city was willing to give to DSNI, were
scattered amongst the privately owned land."' Although most of the
private holdings were tax delinquent, foreclosing on them one by one
would be complicated and time-consuming.'" Developing only the
city-owned land would defeat the goals of critical mass and community-
controlled neighborhood redevelopment. 207 Thus, taking the privately
owned land by eminent domain seemed to DSNI to be the only way to
acquire a coherent area of land on which to implement its plan.'"
In the words of one city official,
part of what made [DSNI's proposal to use eminent domain]
appealing was the fact that this was a group of people who
had come together with a thoughtful, reasonable, potentially
doable plan that would create critical mass where there was
emptiness . . . part of what gave [DSNI] legitimacy was the
vision itself . . . ."2"
Thus, after forming Dudley Neighbors, Inc., the urban redevelop-
ment corporation required under Chapter 121A, DSNI persuaded
the city to authorize its use of eminent domain. 21 )
In 1991, DSNI opened the first eight of 296 units of new housing
in the Dudley neighborhood. 2 " Originally, DSNI hoped to construct
500 units, but it reduced this goal when some sites were found physi-
cally unsuitable for housing and other lots were removed from the plan
targeted most of the projected units for households with incomes of $10,000 to $20,000 (1987
figures). Id.
205
	 MEDOFF & SKIAR, supra note 180, at 117.
2°4 Id.; see Teresa M. Hanafin & John King, Preening the Plaza: Lots & Blocks, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 6, 1989, at A33.
205 MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 180, at 117.
2°6 Id.
"7 Id. at 118.
2t111 Id.
209 1d. at 125 (quoting Lisa Chapnick, Director of Boston Public Facilities Department).
21° See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 180, at 141. Dudley Neighbors, Inc. ("DNI") is a nonprofit
'corporation that acquires and owns land and oversees the development of affordable housing,
community facilities, open space and small business on vacant land in Dudley Triangle. Id. at
126-27.
211 See id. at 151, 161.
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to avoid disputes with owners in the eminent domain process."'" DSNI
plans to finish housing construction before the end of the decade. 213
In the fall of 1994, Boston Mayor Thomas Menino announced $1.2
million in state and city funding for the Dudley town common.'" Other
priorities for the group include creating an economic development
plan to provide jobs and attract businesses and improving educational
opportunities for children and adults. 215
V. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGALITY OF DSNI's USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Under general eminent domain doctrine, DSNI's taking of vacant
lots in Roxbury for redevelopment is constitutional. DSNI's taking does
not satisfy a "use by the public" formulation of the public use test
because the housing built on the vacant lots will be sold to private
individuals."'" Courts have, however, moved away from this narrow
reading of the public use doctrine and now view it as requiring only
that the taking provide a public benefit. 2 ' 7 In DSNI's case, the public
would benefit from having trash-filled vacant lots transformed into
new, low-income housing.
Lawrence Berger suggests two other issues to examine when de-
termining the propriety of a nongovernmental taking: (1) the relative
weight of the condemnor's need for the taking and the harm to the
condemnee and (2) the practicability of purchase in the open mar-
ket. 218 Under the first test, DSNI's need to attain critical mass through
assembling contiguous tracts of land is balanced against the property
rights of the vacant lot owners. Critical mass is a key component of
DSNI's comprehensive plan for redevelopment, as it provides a method
for creating a real estate market in which low-income persons can
participate.219 Without a critical mass of land, DSNI could not imple-
ment its plan for the neighborhood as a whole, and redevelopment
would be hindered. 220 Although the vacant lot owners have a strong
interest in keeping their land as an investment, they are not necessarily
interested in these lots as unique pieces of land. In fact, because of tax
212 1d. at 151.
213 See. Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
214 Roxbury to Get New Common, BosToN GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1994, at 37.
215 Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
2111
	 The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, supra note 2, at 603.
217 See id. at 606.
218 Berger, supra note 26, at 223-24.
219 See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 180, at 108.
221  See id. at 117.
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delinquency, most of the owners of these lots eventually would lose
their property through foreclosure proceedings. 221 Therefore, DSNI's
need outweighs potential harm to vacant lot owners.
Under the second test suggested by Berger, DSNI could not prac-
ticably purchase these lots on the open market. 222 The owners of the
lots presumably would be reluctant to sell to DSNI at a fair price
because their land would greatly increase in value after DSNI com-
pleted its projects. 225 Furthermore, even if some owners would be
willing to sell at a fair price, this would not guarantee that DSNI would
attain critical mass. Eminent domain would be the only way to assure
that DSNI obtained the land required to implement its redevelopment
plan in a comprehensive fashion. 224
DSNI's taking of vacant lots is constitutional under the standard
set out in cases involving the use of eminent domain for urban rede-
velopment. 225 In Berman, the United States Supreme Court construed
as narrow the role of the judiciary in determining whether eminent
domain was being exercised for a public purpose. 226 The Court stated
that it would give deference to a determination by Congress that a
taking served the public purpose if that determination took into ac-
count a wide variety of values. 227 In Berman, once Congress established
the public purpose of its redevelopment plan, the Court refused to
second-guess the validity of the taking of a particular tract of land. 228
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. and Hawaii Housing Authority,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed its deference to legislative determina-
tions of public use. 229 The Court will overrule a legislature's judgment
of what constitutes a public use only if the use is palpably without
reasonable foundation. 23° Furthermore, the Court in Hawaii Housing
Authority indicated that the mere fact that property is taken by eminent
domain and transferred directly to a private party does not transform
the taking's purpose from public to private."'
221 Id.
222 See Berger, supra note 26, at 224-25.
223 See Maoorr & SK1AR, supra note 180, at 264.
224 Id.
225 See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Gorp., 503 U.S. 407, 419 (1992);
Hawaii Hons. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984); Berman .v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954).
226
 348 U.S. at 32.
227 1d. at 33.
228 See id. at 35-36.
229 See National R.R. Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 419; Hawaii Haus. Auth., 467 U.S. at 231 -32.
23° Hawaii Haus. Auth., 467 U.S. at 241.
291 See id. at 243-44.
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Leaving aside the question of who is exercising the power, DSNI's
taking of the vacant lots is constitutional under the rationale of these
Supreme Court cases. DSNI could establish the public purpose of its
redevelopment plan as a whole because the Dudley Street neighbor-
hood's very high rates of crime and poverty would decrease following
redevelopment. 232
 Under Berman, once a public purpose in the greater
plan is established, one need not examine separately the need for
taking each vacant lot."" This conclusion would not be changed by the
fact that the property would eventually be used by private individuals,
because Hawaii Housing Authority stated that it is only the taking's
purpose, not its mechanics, that must satisfy the public use require-
me n t. 2"
Although the Supreme Court case law thoroughly addresses the
public use requirement, it leaves open the question of exactly who may
exercise the power of eminent domain.2" In Berman, Hawaii Housing
Authority, and National Railroad Passenger Corp., governmental bodies
or agencies carried out the takings.z 3t' Historically, courts did allow
private corporations, in the form of railroads and public utilities, to
exercise eminent domain powers in an effort to encourage industriali-
zation. 237
 Courts, however, largely overlooked the private nature of
these corporations because they could justify the takings under the
narrow definition of public use as literally "use by the public." 2"
These courts failed to address the problem of public account-
ability, which arises when a private entity exercises a traditional govern-
mental function. Public use doctrine may have operated as a stand-in
for public accountability when courts construed it narrowly.'" If the
general public has a right to use the condemned property, the private
corporation perforce had the public's interests in mind when it exer-
cised eminent domain power. With the broadening of the public use
doctrine, however, that protection has vanished, and courts should
292 Seee. M EDOFF & SKLAR, Supra note 180, at 3.
233 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36.
234 See 467 U.S. at 244.
235
 See National R.R Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 419; Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 241;
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
236
 See National RR. Passenger Carp., 503 U.S. at 421-22 (condemnation performed by ICC,
a government agency); Hawaii Hons. Auth., 467 U.S. at 234 (housing authority, a government
agency, granted power of eminent domain); Berman, 348 U.S. at 30 (Congress created District of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency to exercise eminent domain power).
237 See Meidinger, supra note 10, at '28.
251g See id.
239 See id,
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look more closely at the delegation issues involved with the private
exercise of eminent domain.
David Lawrence's due process analysis provides a framework for
reviewing DSNI's exercise of eminent domain power. 24° The first step
involves analyzing the extent to which the delegation creates a risk of
conflict between public and private interests."' In this situation, the
public's interest lies both in the preservation of private property rights
and in the redevelopment of blighted neighborhoods. DSNI's private
interest is in redevelopment through specific projects such as building
low-income housing. Thus, the public's and DSNI's interests converge
in having the Dudley Street neighborhood redeveloped but diverge
over private property rights.
Given the extent to which decades of neglect and abuse have
harmed the Dudley neighborhood, the public could be said to have a
stronger interest in redevelopment than it has in private property
rights. 242
 Unless the entire neighborhood can be included in a com-
prehensive plan, it will fall victim to the same fate as countless other
redeveloped neighborhoods."' Consequently, the delegation of emi-
nent domain power to DSNI creates a low risk of conflict between
public and private interests.
The second tier of this due process analysis involves determining
what type of safeguards should accompany the delegation of eminent
domain to DSNI, given the level of conflict between public and private
interests.244 Although this conflict is relatively slight, some limits should
be placed on the extent to which DSNI, a private group, can exercise
such a powerful tool. Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 121A, the
statute under which the BRA granted DSNI the power of eminent
domain, provides certain safeguards."' Before a redevelopment plan
that includes the use of eminent domain can go forward, the city
council and planning board must make a determination of the extent
to which it serves a public benefit. 24° If they approve of the plan, the
council and board then issue a certificate to the BRA, which in turn
makes a determination as to whether conditions exist that warrant the
carrying out of the project. 247 The statute's use of the public benefit
240 See Lawrence, supra note 97, at 659-62.
241 See id. at 685.
242 See Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
243 See supra note 184 and accompanying text for examples of this phenomenon.
244 See Lawrence, supra note 97, at 685.
243 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, § 6 (1988).
2411 See id.
247 See id.
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test, however, is not much of a safeguard, given the broad formulations
courts have given that phrase."'
The inclusive nature of DSNI provides another safeguard against
abuse because those likely to be affected by the takings could join the
group performing them. 249 Several of the affected land owners are
people holding the property for speculation who do not live in the
neighborhood and would be unlikely to want to join the grass-roots
reform effort. 25" Nevertheless, the fact that the property owners could
become DSNI members serves as a due process protection.
Although the case law discussing the constitutionality of takings
by private corporations under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter
121A is slim, the Illinois and Missouri courts have discussed more
directly the same issue under similar statutes. 251 Both the Missouri and
Illinois Supreme Courts have held that they would not second-guess
the legislature's decision regarding who should be vested with the
power of eminent domain once they found a public purpose for the
taking. 252 Thus, the standard under the redevelopment corporations
statutes, similar to that developed in eminent domain case law, focuses
on the public use. 2"
Although courts have adopted a broad formulation of the public
use test for general eminent domain cases, takings by private corpora-
tions in the redevelopment context call for a more narrow reading of
the public use requirement. In other eminent domain circumstances,
courts have interpreted the "public" part of the public use test in very
general terms. 254 If taking the condemned property somehow benefit-
ted society at large, then that taking satisfied the public use test. 255
By contrast, a taking by a private corporation for urban redevel-
opment should be reviewed under a strict standard to ensure that the
taking benefits the residents of the neighborhood in which it occurs.
Because the goal of the taking is to aid redevelopment of a particular
24g See Hawaii Hons. Auth. v Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 (1984).
249 See Spaid, supra note 4, at 10.
25D See id.
251 See, e.g., Zurn v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.2d 18, 29 (M. 1945); Annbar Assocs. v. West Side
Redev. Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 648 (Mo. 1965).
252 See Zurn, 59 N.E.2d at '19; Annbar Assocs., 397 S.W.2d at 648.
253 See Zurn, 59 N.E.2d at 29; Annbar Assocs., 397 S.W,2d at 645.
254
	 e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U,S. 407, 419 (1992);
Hawaii Hous. Auth, v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954).
255 See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger corp., 503 U.S. at 419; Hawaii Hous. Autli., 467 U.S. at
231-32; Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
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area, the people benefitting from the use of the condemned property
should be the people living in the blighted area. These benefits should
include low-income housing, commercial services such as banks and
grocery stores, and recreational opportunities.
This stricter formulation of the public use test protects the inter-
ests of the blighted area's residents more effectively than the formula-
tions of public benefit under the typical urban redevelopment corpo-
rations statute. 25" The statutory requirements for public benefit are
often overbroad. Under these statutes, a private corporation can gain
approval to take land in a blighted neighborhood to build a large office
tower. 257 Although an office tower eliminates blighted conditions to the
extent that it eradicates empty, trash-filled lots, it does very little to
provide the things such as affordable housing that can end the cyclical
poverty that led to the blighted conditions in the first place.
Under this stricter formulation of the public use test, DSNI's
taking of vacant lots for implementing its comprehensive plan would
be constitutional, but a private corporation's taking of property to
build an office tower would not be. DSNI's plan includes constructing
affordable housing, building playgrounds, and constructing a town
common and community center. 258 These uses of the condemned land
will directly benefit the Dudley neighborhood residents by providing
them with much-needed facilities. If a private corporation were allowed
to construct an office tower in the Dudley neighborhood, the residents
would not benefit to nearly the same extent. Although an office tower
might provide a few jobs, it would not meet the other needs of the
community and thus would not satisfy the stricter formulation of the
public use test.
VI. CONCLUSION
The power of eminent domain has evolved over the centuries away
from its original purpose of allowing the government to condemn
private land to the extent that it would be used by the public at large.
Modern eminent domain law acknowledges this history only fleetingly,
as it brushes aside strict requirements of use by the public in favor of
a loose public benefit standard. This Note suggests that a stricter public
use test should be reinstated in the context of private corporations
256 See, e.g., 315 ILCS 20/1 to-44 (1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 121A, §§ 1-19 (1988); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 353.010—.180 (1991).
25' 7 See Opinion of the Justices, 168 N.E.2d 858, 868 (Mass. 1956).
2' s See Spaid , supra note 4, at 10.
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exercising eminent domain power for urban redevelopment. This new
incarnation of the strict test would focus on who would benefit from
the use to which the condemned property would be put. This test
would address potential concerns about delegating a power tradition-
ally reserved to the state by providing a safeguard against private
condemnations for uses that would not ultimately benefit the residents
of the blighted neighborhood.
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